

FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

An analysis of current international events



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Public Support Needed to Implement Brussels Plans

WASHINGTON—If governments controlled the actions of nations, the United States could be certain that in the Brussels meeting of December 17-19 the foreign ministers of the North Atlantic treaty states fixed the foreign policy of this country and its allies for a long period to come. At Brussels the foreign ministers agreed to implement the long-standing policy of containing the Soviet Union by strength of arms when at last they accepted plans for the creation of a unified, integrated army with the task of defending Western Europe. They asked President Truman to appoint General Dwight D. Eisenhower as commander in chief of that army, and he obliged them. "This meeting at Brussels was the conclusion of a chapter in a long book," Secretary of State Dean Acheson told his press conference on December 22. "We have finished the matter of organization. From now on it is action which counts."

Government and People

However, the willingness of states to act by carrying out the plans will depend not on the present readiness of existing governments to abide by their commitments but on the mood of peoples and parliaments. In the long run the public in nondictatorial states controls the action of governments, and it is difficult to determine whether Western governments now accurately reflect national moods. Despite the existence of the North Atlantic treaty for more than a year, the European member states have not yet increased the size of their armed forces sufficiently to provide General Eisenhower with an integrated army of real strength.

The meaning of Brussels will become clear when the British, French, Norwegian and other European parliaments debate the military budgets for their countries in 1951 and express themselves on the vexing question of how much of their resources, needed for economic reconstruction and development, they should sacrifice for rearmament. The meaning will become still more clear when the United States Congress discloses, in its debate on foreign policy bills and appropriations during the first six months of 1951, whether former President Herbert C. Hoover expressed the views of many Americans when on December 20 he recommended in a radio address this country's abandonment of efforts to defend continental Europe until our allies erect a "sure dam against the Red flood" by arming themselves. Hoover proposed that the United States establish defenses in Britain and Japan but otherwise withdraw strategically into the Western Hemisphere. Acceptance of this proposal would mean repudiation of the North Atlantic treaty, which Secretary Acheson signed on behalf of the United States in April 1949, which the Senate accepted in June 1949, and to which the recent Brussels meeting gave new force.

Uncertainty about the identity of views between government and people contributed to the postponement by the foreign ministers at Brussels of a decision about one major question before them—the role of Germany in Western European defense. "German participation [in the integrated army] would strengthen the defense of Europe without altering in any way the purely defensive character of the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization," the Brussels communiqué said. "The Council [of Atlantic treaty foreign ministers] invited the governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States to explore this matter with the government of the German Federal Republic." Thus the Truman Administration gave up the position, calling for immediate arming of German military units and their inclusion in the Western European army, which it adopted at the meeting of North Atlantic foreign ministers in New York City in September and of defense ministers in Washington in October. One factor in the change was a threat of retaliatory military action by the East German Democratic Republic in the event West Germany were armed. Another was the continuing reluctance of France to admit German forces to the European army, in spite of French acceptance of the proposition in principle before the Brussels meeting.

Bonn's Hesitation

The chief factor in the postponement, however, was Bonn's hesitation to rearm in accordance with the plan of the North Atlantic powers, which seek German help but hold that German military forces should be under non-German control. The United States is confident of gaining support for this plan from Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, who met with the Allied High Commission in Germany on December 20. Dr. Adenauer and the Commissioners agreed to appoint a committee to discuss the West German role in Western European defense. The talks are to begin on January 8, with West Germany

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represented by Dr. Theodor Blank of the Interior ministry; Lt. Gen. Hans Speidel, chief of staff to Gen. Erwin Rommel during World War II; and Lt. Gen. Adolf von Heusinger, once chief of the German high command operations division. The Commissioners have intimated to Dr. Adenauer that if the committee on Germany's role reaches conclusions which the German government will support and the North Atlantic treaty powers will accept, the Western occupying powers will take up the question of replacing the Occupation Statute with a treaty of peace. In a Christmas broadcast from Bonn, Dr. Adenauer reasserted the West German government's determination to defend the nation "together with other peace-loving nations." He continued: "Those who want peace must collect their strength and courage for the defense of their vital principles against the threatening attack."

Dr. Adenauer, however, cannot claim to have the support of a large majority of the inhabitants of the German Federal Republic. He is the leader of a conservative coalition, the major opponent of which, the Social Democratic party, has proved itself to be the strongest party in recent American zone elections. The leader of that party, Dr. Kurt Schumacher, has reiterated his opposition to any military agreement between the Federal Republic and the North Atlantic states which fails to give Germany a position of military and political equality with the other states contributing forces to a Western European army. Many leading German newspapers support this attitude, which is incompatible with the plan of the North Atlantic foreign ministers for subordination of German troops to other powers. The United States has alienated German So-

cialists since the end of World War II by persistently ignoring their recommendations respecting the economic organization of their country.* As a result, Washington has won the support for its anti-Soviet policy not from all anti-Soviet Germans but only from one group of parties in anti-Soviet Western Germany. The successful execution of American policies with respect to Europe depends on the continued supremacy of Dr. Adenauer's group.

Opposition to Acheson

The attitude of European parliaments and voters, as well as of the American Congress, toward the implementation of North Atlantic treaty policy is further confused by uncertainty whether Secretary Acheson will keep his position in the cabinet. On December 15 House Republicans, by an undisclosed majority vote, and Senate Republicans, by 23 to 5, accepted a resolution that stated: "It is completely obvious that Secretary Acheson and the State Department under his leadership have lost the confidence of the Congress and the American people and cannot regain it. Recognizing that fact, we earnestly insist for the good of our country that Mr. Acheson be replaced as Secretary of State, that there be a thorough housecleaning in the State Department, and changes in personnel and policies responsible for this lack of confidence." The Republican Senators voted also to "pledge our fullest cooperation with the President and the Administration in a united effort to meet by the most effective means the present national crisis. For this effort there must

*See Sidney Lens, "Social Democracy and Labor in Germany," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. XXVI, No. 13 (Nov. 15, 1950).

be national cooperation in substance as well as in form, in fact as well as in name."

The partisan attack on Acheson, which originated last February with accusations by Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican of Wisconsin, prevents clear-cut discussion of the substance of the issue raised by Herbert Hoover in his plea for an American diplomatic retreat. Debate about the interests of the United States become entangled with debate about the competence of Acheson to judge the nature of American interests. President Truman thus far has backed his Secretary of State. He told his press conference on December 19 that he would not dismiss Acheson. He called the Republican charges "false." This "is a time for making use of the great talents of men like Dean Acheson: Communism—not our own country—would be served by losing him," the President said. The President's own ability to command party support on foreign policy matters was strikingly shown on December 18, when the Senate rejected by 45 to 30 a resolution sponsored by 24 Republican Senators calling on President Truman to report in detail to Congress about any commitments he gave to British Prime Minister Clement R. Attlee during the latter's recent visit here. Every Democrat present in the Senate voted against this proposed intrusion by the legislative branch into the province of the executive branch of the government. Acheson cannot count on wholehearted Democratic backing, but in spite of Republican opposition, the Administration's foreign policy appears to have considerable public support.

BLAIR BOLLES

How Will Britain's Recovery Affect Arms Effort?

Whatever their innermost fears may be about the suspension, effective January 1, of Marshall plan aid to their country, the British did not permit these fears to interfere with the Christmas celebrations. In London, from Piccadilly Circus, up Regent Street to Oxford Street and then over to Hyde Park, stores have been jammed—many with queues—doing a record-breaking business.

The joint Anglo-American announcement on December 13 of the Marshall plan aid suspension came as a surprise to the average Briton. According to *The New York Times* of December 14, the

"first inkling that the British people had that one of the mainstays of their national economy was being withdrawn" came with the official communiqué. The FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN on November 10, however, had said that British and American officials were "expected to begin discussions soon on the possibility of suspending or curtailing Marshall plan aid to Britain."

The news that Britain's economy is able to stand clear 18 months ahead of schedule calls for a brief review of economic conditions in that country, past, present and future.

The total amount of ERP funds, including loans, grants and conditional aid, made available to the United Kingdom through December 1950 was \$2,694 million. This figure includes an allotment of \$175 million for the last six months of this year. The delivery of goods purchased with these funds, plus the clearing out of all items in the pipelines, means that ERP-financed purchases will continue to arrive at British ports during most of 1951. The official announcement revealed that certain phases of the ECA program would continue with respect to Britain. Funds for the development of overseas territories,

for technical assistance activities and for increasing raw-material output will still be forthcoming. Since ECA monies were first disbursed in April 1948 the United Kingdom received \$3.98 million, \$2.43 million and \$10.65 million for these respective purposes. The reduction in American aid was attributed to the consequences of the economic recovery made by Britain as well as to the increased burden that the United States defense program—including foreign military aid to the North Atlantic treaty nations under the mutual defense assistance program—placed on this country's economy.

Economic Gains and Problems

The improvements that have been evident in Britain's balance of payments with respect to both the world at-large and the dollar area in particular have been a source of satisfaction to all those who believe that a primary defense against Communist aggression—either internal or external—is a stable economy that operates at high levels of income and employment. The over-all deficit, which was £878 million in 1947, has given way, during the first half of 1950, to a surplus of £20 million. Likewise, the dollar deficit which had fallen to manageable proportions in this period, completely disappeared during the last six months of 1950. Yet, despite the improvement in the trade balance and recent accretions to the gold and dollar reserves—at the close of the third quarter of 1950 reserves stood at \$2,756 million as compared to \$1,425 million on the eve of the devaluation in September 1949—the British economy is by no means out of the woods.

As of December 31 the average Briton is to receive only a shilling's worth of meat a week, of which ten pence will be in fresh meat and two pence in canned corned beef. In weight the ordinary ration will amount to less than one-half pound. This cut in rations was caused by the breakdown in trade negotiations between Britain and the Argentine. The rise in raw-material prices and the short supplies have hit British industry severely. Many large firms are unable to plan production more than a month in advance, so depleted are their raw-material stocks. Last week the government announced that the rationing of sulphur and sulphuric acid—both strategic materials—would start on January 8, because the curtailment of supplies formerly coming from the United States has made a free-market allocation

inconsistent with the needs of industry and "the interests of the national economy."

Britain's Role in Europe

Since the Brussels Conference of the Foreign Ministers and the resulting appointment of General Eisenhower to head a European defense force was widely interpreted as part of a plan to spur the economic and military mobilization of free Europe, the economic situation in Britain is a matter of crucial importance. When arrangements now being worked out within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization regarding the assessment and distribution of the burden of the European defense program is made public, it is certain that Britain will be expected to provide a substantial contribution.

In recent days Britain's attitude toward mobilization—frequently described as somewhat reluctant as compared with the position of this country—has become more forthright and less ambiguous. *The New York Times* of December 22 reports that London "is planning its rearmament program on the basis of what the country needs rather than what it can afford."

What are the main difficulties hindering Britain's defense contributions? The fact that a once devastated nation has finally managed to achieve a balance in its international accounts—the Gray report implies that the balance may well be transitory because the impact of Britain's own defense program and rising raw-material prices has not yet been felt—does not qualify it to be an arsenal of democracy. It is always important to remember the distinction between the proposed and the actual. For the immediate future Britain's capacity to contribute to a European defense program is severely circumscribed by economic forces that have been in motion for at least a decade.* These include the destruction associated with World War II as well as a considerable degree of economic inflexibility that dates back to the interwar period. Recent economic gains are more important as a happy augury for the future than as an indication that current problems have been solved. In an effort to strengthen its role in the world economy the British Commonwealth is just embarking on a six-year \$5-billion program of economic develop-

*See Vera Micheles Dean and Howard C. Gary, "Military and Economic Strength of Western Europe," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. XXVI, No. 11 (Oct. 15, 1950).

ment in South and Southeast Asia. This program was first formulated at a meeting of Commonwealth ministers at Colombo, Ceylon, in January 1950—whence its name—following which it was more precisely drawn up at meetings in Sydney, Australia, in May and in London in September. However, even if the Colombo plan is not emasculated by world events, which have caused this country to give less attention to the Point Four program, it is not likely to be a significant factor in the days immediately ahead.

The recent Truman-Attlee talks and the Brussels conference have reaffirmed the view that all-out war in Asia is to be avoided, if at all possible. The Western nations are agreed that the strengthening of Europe remains their primary objective.

The assurance that this country does not consider Western Europe as "expendable" is bound to have a salutary effect on morale in that area. Given this unity of purpose there is every reason to believe that the democratic nations of Europe, especially Britain and France, will make a maximum contribution to a unified defense effort.

While the joint decision to suspend ECA indicates that future military cooperation between the United States and Britain can be carried out on a basis more nearly approximating mutual defense assistance, it would be a mistake to interpret this development as a sign that the defense of Europe, or even of Britain alone, can be carried out in the absence of American aid.

HOWARD C. GARY

The United States and Japan, by Edwin O. Reischauer. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1950. \$4.

An invaluable guide to understanding contemporary Japan in its international setting by one of the leading authorities on this subject, currently Professor of Far Eastern Languages at Harvard University. Considerable attention is given to geographic and economic foundations, the Japanese character and its reaction to democracy and totalitarianism, and the consequences and problems of the occupation.

The Epic of Korea, by A. Wigfall Green. Washington, Public Affairs Press, 1950. \$2.50.

A somewhat incoherent essay, dealing mainly with the record of American occupation in South Korea, presenting evidence of woeful mismanagement in dealing with a virtually insoluble problem, by an officer who served in Korea, among other positions, as Judge Advocate.

MacArthur: Man of Action, by Frank Kelley and Cornelius Ryan. Garden City, N. Y., Doubleday, 1950. \$2.

A bright, journalistic biographical sketch by two foreign correspondents, stressing General MacArthur's policies and record in Japan.

FPA Bookshelf

BOOKS ON ASIA

The Occupation of Japan, Second Phase: 1948-50, by Robert A. Fearey. New York, Macmillan, 1950. \$3.

Sequel to an earlier volume, also published under the auspices of the International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, this authoritative volume by a member of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs in the Department of State provides a reasoned account of Japanese political and economic development during the past two years, together with a discussion of problems relating to a peace settlement.

The Beginnings of Political Democracy in Japan, by Nobutaka Ike. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1950. \$3.50.

Light on the prospects for democratic development in Japan is shed by this volume which dealt with the *Jiyu minken undo*, or "Movement for liberty and popular rights," which flourished in Japan from the Meiji Restoration in 1875 until its extinction and the triumph of authoritarianism with the promulgation of the constitution in 1889.

Aspects of Japan's Labor Problems, by Miriam S. Farley. New York, John Day, 1950. \$3.50.

The future of Japan will be fundamentally affected by the role of labor organizations whose origins, development under military occupation, and present status are examined in this volume by the editor of the *Far Eastern Survey*, who worked on labor problems for a year under SCAP.

The Left Wing in Southeast Asia, by Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff. New York, William Sloane Associates, 1950. \$4.

A country-by-country survey of labor, Socialism and Communist party activities in a strategically important part of the world now threatened by the expansion of communism from China. The authors, who derived much of their material from on-the-spot observations, have included a valuable biographical appendix giving thumbnail sketches of outstanding leaders in the area.

Human Bondage in Southeast Asia, by Bruno Lasker. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1950. \$6.

A major contribution to understanding an important social problem in Southeast Asia, providing historical depth prerequisite for an intelligent effort to deal with the political and social revolutions through which these countries are now passing. After surveying remnants of personal slavery, the author treats of serfdom, debt bondage, compulsory public services, and modern labor relations, concluding with an appendix giving some documentary material and case studies of specific localities.

Peking Diary, A Year of Revolution, by Derk Bodde. New York, Henry Schuman, 1950. \$3.75.

An intimate and revealing glimpse into many phases of the Communist upheaval in China as seen by a leading American student of Chinese history and philosophy during a year's residence in Peiping—from August 1948 to August 1949—while under a Fulbright Research Fellowship.

Mao Tse-tung, Ruler of Red China, by Robert Payne. New York, Henry Schuman, 1950. \$3.50.

The first full-length biography of the new master of Communist China, throwing light on his indigenous Chinese roots as well as on his Marxist and Russian influences. The author of *Forever China* depicts Mao not only as a man with great power, but also as a complex personality, a scholar, poet and political theorist.

Two Kinds of Time, by Graham Peck. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1950. \$4.

An extensive and detailed portrait of Chinese life as seen by an American serving with the Office of War Information, particularly valuable for its insight into some of the causes of the collapse of the Kuomintang regime. Regarding the new Peiping government, Mr. Peck believes that it will be neither a satellite on the East European model nor will declare its independence like Tito's Yugoslavia, but will be a sort of "junior partner" of the U.S.S.R.

Out of This World: Across the Himalayas to Forbidden Tibet, by Lowell Thomas, Jr., New York, Greystone Press, 1950. \$3.75.

As the Chinese Communists press their campaign to subject far Tibet to their direct control, the appearance of this record by Lowell Thomas, Jr., of his trip with his father to the land of the Dalai Lama makes timely and exciting reading. Profusely illustrated with their own photographs, it depicts the country, its people and its lama institutions.

King-Doctor of Ulithi: The True Story of the War-time Experiences of Marshall Paul Wees, M.D., as related to Francis Beauchesne Thornton. New York, Macmillan, 1950. \$2.50.

Biographical story of a Navy doctor's work among the Christianized people of a Pacific island during World War II, giving a sympathetic portrayal of native life and problems.

Korea Today, by George M. McCune. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1950. (Issued under the auspices of the International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations.) \$5.00.

No more timely volume could have been issued than this study by one of America's leading experts on Korea, whose untimely death prevented him from witnessing a war which has brought into dramatic view many of the underlying tensions and postwar problems that he described so well. Following an introductory historical essay, Professor McCune gives most of his book to an analysis of Russian and American policy and to economic and political developments in the two halves of divided Korea.

Branch and Affiliate Meetings

EASTON, January 4, *Report From Europe*, Brooks Emeny

BETHLEHEM, January 8, *Does Korea Demonstrate the Need For a UN Army?*, Bill Costello

LYNN, January 8, *Asiatic Imperialisms—New and Old*, Judokus Van DenNoort

POUGHKEEPSIE, January 8, *Can We Work With Socialism Against Communism?*, Arthur B. Schlesinger, Jr.

DETROIT, January 11, *Germany and Western Europe*, Preston Slosson

News in the Making

RED RIDDLE IN KOREA: Who calls the turn in the Korean war—the Chinese Communists or the Russians? A *New York Times* dispatch from Tokyo on December 24 quotes UN mission sources to the effect that Yenan-trained Chinese now control Korean policy, while little is being heard from Russian-oriented Communists such as North Korean Premier Kim Il Sung. Peiping is said to have a stronger voice in the Communist offensive than Moscow, supplying the bulk of military equipment as well as of manpower.

ARMS FOR JAPAN? Should Korea be lost, the problem of defending Japan will assume great urgency. In that event, the United States would not be able to spare enough divisions for this purpose. The 75,000 Japanese National Police Reserve, authorized and created last July following outbreak of the Korean war, could be converted, it is said, into four divisions as the nucleus for a build-up of ground forces.

NEW REINSURANCE POLICY FOR GERMANY? Reports from Germany indicate that the Adenauer government may steer a course modeled on Bismarck's "reinsurance" policy and Stresemann's interwar policy of balancing off the Western powers and the Soviet Union. While negotiating with the North Atlantic treaty nations about German rearmament, Bonn has let it be known that it may answer in sympathetic tones the letter of the East German premier, Otto Grotewohl, requesting bilateral talks on unification.

HOPE FOR PALESTINE REFUGEES? A slight break may occur in the deadlock created by the unwillingness of either Israel or the neighboring Arab states to provide permanent homes for 800,000 Palestinian refugees. The Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs—as reported on December 25—is contemplating a request for \$5 million from the UN Relief and Works Agency fund of \$30 million authorized by the General Assembly on December 2 for use in "the reintegration of the refugees into the economic life of the Near East."

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